Prepared by Michael Paine, Vehicle Design & Research Pty Ltd
for the National Road Transport Commission, 1995.This report sets out the results of an analysis of bus accidents in Australia over the period 1970 to 1993. It forms a reference document for another report on Australian bus construction standards and is intended to be read in conjunction with that report.
The three main sources of information were:
Most of the accident "details" are based on an analysis of the press clippings. It is therefore likely to be heavily biased towards crashes occuring in New South Wales. The reports are also likely to be biased towards fatal crashes, particularly those involving children. An analysis of press clipping statistics against official State/Territory statistics has been undertaken and is described in this report.Reports by road safety organisations such as the Federal Office of Road Safety and the NSW Road Safety Bureau Annual statistical reports by each State and Territory, supplemented by additional processing, where available Press clippings from the Fairfax Infoline service For passengers getting on/off or falling from buses, 12 cases were found in NSW P4 accident reports between 1989 and 1991 as part of a separate project (looking at the need for seat belts on "school" buses). None of these cases were reported in the press, therefore the overall figures for this type of accident are likely to be a gross under-estimate.
State/Territory Accident Statistics
Appendix A sets out the overall bus accidents for each State/Territory, as recorded by the relevant authority. In most cases accident statistics prior to 1981 were not readily available (i.e not in a form compatible with the current computer system used in that State/Territory).
Press Clippings
Over 300 press clippings were obtained from Infoline. Most of these were from the Sydney Morning Herald or the (Sydney) Sun. The more serious accidents tended to have a several articles due to follow-up by journalists and reporting of coronial inquiries (a good source of information). Overall 223 separate accidents were identified from press clippings. A further 17 accidents were found during the school bus seat belt project or from research reports but were not found in the press clippings.
[Note: Appendicies not available in HTML version]
Details of all of the accidents are contained in Appendix D. Appendix B contains a summary of all accidents, by year and Appendix C contains a summary of accidents of particular interest, such as those involving roll-over.
The following tables summarise the key results of the analysis.
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Type of Casualty |
Fatal |
Serious |
Minor |
Numbers of crashes |
|
|
|
All bus casualties |
|
|
|
Bus Drivers |
|
|
|
Bus Passengers |
|
|
|
Bus passengers getting on/off or falling off |
|
|
|
# There were five additional crashes where there were no injuries or unknown injuries
|
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| Type of bus |
|
|
|
|
| Total crashes examined |
91
|
41
|
93
|
15
|
|
|
||||
| Fatal crashes |
40(44%)
|
6(15%)
|
13(14%)
|
6(40%)
|
| Serious Injury crashes |
33
|
21
|
21
|
7
|
| Other injury crashes |
17
|
13
|
56
|
2
|
| Non-injury or unknown injury |
1
|
1
|
3
|
-
|
| Bus rolled |
47(52%)
|
2 (5%)
|
5 (5%)
|
1 (7%)
|
| Bus caught fire |
3 (3%)
|
1 (2%)
|
2 (2%)
|
2 (13%)
|
|
|
||||
| Fatalities |
170
|
17
|
11
|
23
|
| Serious injury |
577
|
60
|
109
|
71
|
| Minor injury |
1104
|
381
|
558
|
69
|
|
|
||||
| Fatalities |
-
|
3
|
4
|
-
|
| Serious injury |
-
|
-
|
5
|
-
|
| Minor injury |
-
|
-
|
12
|
-
|
Comparison of press clippings with State/Territory statisticsNewspaper articles are likely to be biased towards the more sensational crashes and those occuring locally. An analysis of the overall statistics for the press clippings against the "official" accident statistics confirms this assumption. The following table sets out the results of this analysis.
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||
| ACT
(81-93) |
FORS |
11
|
11
|
|||||||
| Press |
0
|
0
|
||||||||
| Press % |
0%
|
0% | ||||||||
| NSW
(81-93) |
Acc. Rec. |
204
|
1053
|
|
301
|
|
6457
|
104
|
828
|
3505
|
| Press |
26
|
34
|
61
|
98
|
1918
|
929
|
85
|
256
|
927
|
|
| Press % |
13%
|
3%
|
2%
|
33%
|
107%
|
14%
|
82%
|
31%
|
26%
|
|
| NSW
excluding 1989 |
Acc. Rec |
179
|
963
|
2875
|
217
|
1581
|
5813
|
48
|
697
|
3109
|
| Press |
23
|
29
|
51
|
40
|
1647
|
748
|
31
|
184
|
744
|
|
| Press % |
13%
|
3%
|
2%
|
18%
|
104%
|
13%
|
65%
|
27%
|
24%
|
|
| NT
(81-93) |
FoRS |
8
|
8
|
|||||||
| Press |
1
|
6
|
||||||||
| Press % |
13%
|
75%
|
||||||||
| QLD
(86-93) |
Acc. Rec. |
74
|
324
|
571
|
81
|
595
|
1294
|
31
|
306
|
778
|
| Press |
9
|
3
|
5
|
29
|
64
|
241
|
25
|
145
|
241
|
|
| Press % | 12% |
1%
|
1%
|
36% |
11%
|
19%
|
80%
|
47%
|
31%
|
|
| SA
(81-93) |
FoRS |
35
|
39
|
|||||||
| Press |
2
|
2
|
||||||||
| Press % |
6%
|
5%
|
||||||||
| TAS
(81-93) |
Acc. Rec. |
16
|
56
|
108
|
18
|
77
|
160
|
1
|
22
|
57
|
| Press |
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
11
|
10
|
0
|
2
|
8
|
|
| Press % |
0%
|
2%
|
0%
|
0%
|
14%
|
6%
|
0%
|
9%
|
14%
|
|
| VIC
(83-93) |
Acc. Rec. |
107
|
1251
|
2654
|
137
|
48
|
835
|
2945
|
||
| Press |
52
|
5
|
2
|
25
|
16
|
36
|
177
|
|||
| Press % |
2%
|
0%
|
2%
|
18%
|
33%
|
4%
|
6%
|
|||
| WA
(81-93) |
Acc. Rec. |
23
|
196
|
622
|
35
|
24
|
140
|
632
|
||
| Press |
2
|
2
|
0
|
11
|
11
|
10
|
13
|
|||
| Press % |
9%
|
1%
|
0%
|
31%
|
46%
|
7%
|
2%
|
|||
It is evident that the clippings are biased towards NSW & Queensland. They are also biased towards crashes in which bus/coach occupants were killed. Newspaper clippings accounted for 82% of bus occupant fatalities in NSW but only about 30% of bus occupants injuries.The table includes NSW results with 1989 excluded, due to the Grafton and Kempsey coach crashes which occurred in that year. These rows should give a reasonable indication of the typical accident statistics over the period 1981 to 1993, as summarised in the following notes.
The following observations are based on NSW accident statistics for the period 1981-88 and 1990-93.
Fatalities
Serious injuries (in addition to fatalities described above)On average there was one bus occupant fatality for every four fatal crashes involving a bus reported by the Police. On average there was one bus occupant fatality for every 84 casualty crashes involving a bus reported by the Police On average there were two bus occupant fatalities for every fatal crash involving a bus reported in the press On average there was one bus occupant fatality for every two casualty crashes involving a bus reported in the press.
On average there were four bus occupants seriously injured for every fatal crash involving a bus reported by the Police. On average there was one bus occupant seriously injured for every six casualty crashes involving a bus reported by the Police. On average there were 30 bus occupants seriously injured for every fatal crash involving a bus reported in the press. On average there were seven bus occupants seriously injured for every casualty crash involving a bus reported in the press. For comparison, the following values have been derived from "Road Traffic Accidents in NSW 1993":
On average there were 2.5 vehicle occupant fatalities for every fatal crash reported by the Police (ten times the rate for buses). On average there was one vehicle occupant fatality for every 12 casualty crashes reported by the Police (eight times the rate for buses) On average there were three vehicle occupants seriously injured for every fatal crash reported by the Police (similar to buses). On average there was one vehicle occupant seriously injured for every casualty crash reported by the Police (six times the rate for buses). Special Cases
This section sets out some key results of the analysis of press clippings and reports. It is subject to the qualification that the cases might not be representative of all crashes involving buses. Further details are contained in Appendix C. These special cases are also discussed in the main report for this project (G179a).
Fire (Cases 7,16,35,41,89,161,220,223)
In eight of the press clipping cases the bus caught fire. These cases accounted for ten fatalities and 25 serious injuries, although one case (Number 89) involved all ten fatalities and four serious injuries.
Three of the cases (7, 89 & 220) involved mini-buses. Apparently all three had petrol engines. In case 89 the mini-bus hit a tree then caught fire. In cases 7 and 220 mini-buses caught fire while they were travelling along the road.
In cases 35 and 161 buses collided head-on with another vehicle which caught fire. In each case the fire engulfed the bus and the occupants had to escape via the rear window (emergency exit).
Case 16 had the potential to be a very severe crash. A coach was pushed off a mountain road by a following coach, which experienced brake failure. The coach rolled several times down an embankment. It burst into flames after the occupants had escaped. 16 occupants received serious injuries in this crash.
Case 19 did not involve fire but, again, had the potential to be a very severe crash. A petrol tanker ran into the rear of a bus carrying school children.
The number of crashes involving fire is too small to draw conclusions but the cases do suggest petrol-engined mini-buses are over-represented.
Brake Failure (Cases 1,9,16,28, 38,46,51,52,55,58,94,101,103,114,223)
A total of 15 cases involved failure of brakes on a bus. These cases accounted for a total of 41 fatalities (nearly 20% of all fatalities) and 103 serious injuries.
In eight of the cases (1,9,6,28,38,46,114,223) the brakes failed while the bus was descending a steep road. Brake fade could have been a factor in each of these cases. Mechanical faults were a factor in at least two of these "brake fade" cases (1 & 28).
Mechanical faults appear to have been a factor in the remaining seven cases.
In one case (94) a tailshaft broke as the vehicle was descending a steep hill. The tailshaft severed the brake lines leaving the driver with no means to stop the vehicle. Although this was the only case of its type found in the analysis it does raise questions about the design of tailshafts and the proximity of brake lines.
Emergency Exits
In at least 65 of the cases the bus emergency exits may have been a factor in the crash. These cases accounted for 152 fatalities and 426 serious injuries. They include 55 cases where the bus rolled over or rolled onto its side, eight cases involving fire and the 1989 Kempsey bus crash (in which the emergency exits were criticised). In several of the cases of roll-over the roof was ripped from the bus and occupants were ejected. If these buses had been built to ADR59 standards then the occupants may have been retained in the vehicle and the emergency exits would have been a factor.
Several other less serious crashes involved frontal collision damage to the bus which prevented occupants from getting out via the front door and they had to use the emergency exit (generally with difficulty due to the height above the roadway).
In one case (123) a child was seriously injured when he leaned against the rear window and the window popped out. The child fell onto the roadway. This case suggests a need for minimum push-out forces for emergency exits.
Door Entrapment (95,124,141,144,152,169,180,186)
Eight cases involved a bus passenger trapped in a bus door. These cases accounted for three fatalities and two serious injuries. It is evident, however, that these cases are grossly under-reported in both the Police reporting system and the press. For example, five of the cases were found during an analysis of NSW bus accidents during school hours resulting in injury to child occupants (a study concerned with the need for seat belts on "school buses"). These cases of door entrapment, which were not reported in the press, turned up unexpectedly during detailed analysis of Police accident reports. Similar cases outside school hours and involving adults as well as children could be expected but were not evident from the available crash data.
If it is assumed that the above analysis is representative of door entrapments, that school children transport accounts for about one half of entrapment cases and that NSW has about one third of all route service/school bus travel, then, as a very rough estimate, two passengers are killed and a further eight are injured due to bus door entrapment in Australia each year.
Pedestrian Safety - Flashing Warning Lamps on "school" buses
Road accident records do not necessarily indicate the involvement of a bus in a pedestrian accident where a child is struck by another vehicle in the vicinity of a bus. An analysis of NSW pedestrian accidents during school hours in 1988-89 by the NSW Road Safety Bureau found, out of 107 cases:
56 children emerged from the front of a bus and were hit by a vehicle passing the bus in the same direction. Of these 20 were seriously injured but none were killed. One child was on a pedestrian crossing at the time. 17 of the serious injury cases were in 60km/h speed zones. Three were in 80 or 100km/h speed zones.
23 children emerged from the rear of a bus and were hit by a vehicle travelling in the opposite direction. Of these three were killed and ten received serious injuries. Two of the fatal cases and five of the serious injury cases were in 80 or 100km/h zone and the remainder were in 60km/h zones.
One child was seriously injured while running across the road to catch a bus.
Nine children were struck by a bus. One was killed and two were seriously injured.
The study identified the problem of child pedestrians being struck by vehicles travelling in the opposite direction due to the bus obscuring pedestrians crossing behind the bus (including after the bus moves off). These cases were more likely to occur in rural areas and were more likely to be fatalities. The study recommended that flashing lights be fitted to the front of buses and that other measures be introduced to address the problem.
If the NSW casualties over the two year period are assumed to be representative of school children pedestrian accidents near buses then it is estimated that each year in Australia four children are killed and 45 are seriously injured in this type of accident. Flashing lights on buses transporting school children, together with behavioural measures for children and motorists, could influence these types of accidents.
A problem identified during this study and during the school bus seat belt study is that there are very few dedicated "school buses". Most buses which are used to transport school children are used for normal route services at other times. It was estimated that 90% of the NSW route service bus fleet was used to transport school children on a regular basis. The consequence is that measures such as painting "school buses" yellow and fitting them with permanent signs will have reduced effect because motorists will encounter these conspicuous buses at times when they are not carrying school children and the motorists will probably become "de-sensitised". Flashing lights have the advantage that they are only turned on a critical times.
The finding that the more serious cases are likely to occur in 100km/h zones has implications for the brightness of lights used on school buses. A motorist travelling from either direction at 100km/h will need to see and recognise the flashing lights at least 240m away in order to be able to slow down to an appropriate speed (say 40km/h) without heavy braking. Aftermarket turn signal or brake lamps which comply with the Australian Design Rules have insufficient luminous intensity for this purpose in bright daylight.
Conclusion
This report is intended as a reference document for the main report associated with this project (Report G179a "Australian Bus Safety Standards" - extract below). Observations and conclusions about the accident analysis are contained in that report.
Acknowledgments
The assistance of the following persons is gratefully acknowledged:
Margaret Smith & Graham Hoskin, NSW Road Safety Bureau Library
Robert Ramsey & Phil Young, NSW RSB Accident Analysis
Bob Gardner & Pat Rogerson, Vicroads
MarkHealy, Laura Menhennett & John Dombrose, WA Police Services
Susan Curie & Bert Elson, Tasmanian Transport & Works
Ross Maunder & James Hurnall, Queensland Transport
Chris Coxan, SA Office of Road Safety & Rick Smith SA Department of Road Transport
Sandra Arthur, Infoline, John Fairfax Group.
Extract from Report G179a
Door entrapment
Some other points in the report are:
*entrapment is also occurring with front doors
*many cases of entrapment resulting in injury to a passeneger are not regarded as traffic accidents and therefore do not appear in road accident statistics
*technical means are available to prevent entrapment. Suitable sensors, developed for industrial safety applications could be used but had not yet been fitted as a total system to a bus.
Dr Henderson found that mirror systems on buses were generally inadeqate. In many buses the driver has the option of adjusting external mirrors to view either traffic or the outside of doorways but not both. In overcoming the problem it is important not to overload the driver with too many mirrors and an effective compromise appears to be to provide a mildy convex external mirror on left side of the bus. The technical specification permits the use of such mirrors but sets in minimum image size for an object representing a child near each door (this has the effect of limiting the amount of convexity).
Queensland Transport has developed a specification for seat tops and stanchions to be padded to prevent minor injuries in crashes or heavy braking. It is understood that these requirements are being considered for inclusion in the "Code of Practice for Improved Occupant Protection in Existing Buses".
Victoria has banned the fitment of handrails across the top seat squabs since 1980. Corner handholds are acceptable.
During an investigation into school bus seat belts, Dr Henderson and Mr Paine examined a total of 37 crashes involving child bus occupant casualties during school travel times, over a four year period in NSW. Relevant findings were that:
*97.5% of injuries were minor. Common injuries were to the face, head and neck - probably as a result of contact with the seat in front.
*fitment of seat belts to large buses in the NSW bus fleet (90% of which are used for school transport) was not justified.
*loopholes in the ADRs which have the effect of exempting some small buses from fitment of seat belts to all seating positions should be closed.
* It was estimated that fitment of padding to seat tops and stanchions had the potential to save one serious injury and 75 minor injuries out of all the cases studied (over four years). It was also estimated that this would cost about $1,100 per bus. For approximately 6,000 large buses in NSW the total fitment cost would be about $7 million.
*For comparison, it was estimated that fitment of lap/sash seat belts to these 6,000 buses (and about 1,700 small buses) would cost over $200 million and had the potential to save one fatality, two serious injuries and 100 minor injuries.
Note that the potential injury savings were for the time that children were using the buses during school travel hours. The benefits would also be available to other passengers at other times.
Irrespective of the retrofit issue, there is a clear case for following
the Victorian lead and banning the fitment of handrails across the top
of seat squabs on new route service buses.
A recurring feature of the analysis of press clippings was the number of serious crashes where a bus carrying school children on an excursion ran off the road and rolled onto its side or rolled over several times down a hillside. Although the press clippings can be expected to be biased towards this dramatic type of crash the cases do reinforce the approach proposed by Queensland to require higher safety standards on "regional" buses (used for forward journeys up to 350km).
A typical scenario is a bus carrying school children on an excursion. It is negotiating a narrow, winding road. For some reason (e.g. oncoming vehicle, brake failure (fade) or road failure) the bus moves off the edge of the road and plunges down the hillside or embankment. Subject to the limited information available from the press clippings, some typical factors in these types of accidents were:
*the driver was probably unfamiliar with road and was generally on the return journey (perhaps tired or distracted)
*the bus was probably one of the oldest "coaches" in the fleet
The proposed "Code of Practice for Improved Occupant Protection in Existing
Buses" creates the opportunity to categorise the safety of existing buses
and this could be used to implement a system similar to that proposed for
Queensland.
Automatic transmissions relieve the driver from the task of selecting
gears and clutch control at the critical time of moving out from the bus
stop. Most new buses are fitted with automatic transmissions and there
is a case for requiring all new route service buses to have automatic transmissions.
It is important that these transmissions also provide either engine braking
or retarder braking.
During roadside brake testing of heavy vehicles in NSW out-of-adjustment brakes have been found to be the biggest cause of poor brake performance. Automatic slack adjusters alleviate this problem, which might not be evident until the bus attempts a long descent and the remaining, over-worked brakes experience fade. A total of 15 cases of brake failure were found during the accident analysis and these cases accounted for 41 fatalities (20% of all fatalities) and 103 serious injuries. At least eight of the cases involved steep descents.
In one case a tailshaft broke as the vehicle was descending a steep hill. The tailshaft severed the brake lines leaving the driver with no means to stop the vehicle. Although this was the only case of its type found in the analysis it does raise questions about the design of tailshafts and the proximity of brake lines.
Anti-lock braking systems (ABS) have been fitted to NSW government buses
for more than 10 years, with excellent operational experience. The effectiveness
of ABS in the analysed crash cases cannot be determined due to a lack of
information about the pre-crash phase in each case. Crash investigations
in Europe and the USA have estimated that ABS would have prevented about
10% of heavy vehicle crashes. The NRTC is currently investigating the cost
effectiveness of ABS on a range of heavy vehicles, including coaches.
In at least 65 of the cases the bus emergency exits may have been a factor in the crash. These cases accounted for 142 fatalities and 426 serious injuries. These cases include 55 cases where the bus rolled over or rolled onto its side, eight cases involving fire and the 1989 Kempsey bus crash (in which the emergency exits were criticised). In several of the cases of roll-over the roof was ripped from the bus and occupants were ejected. If these buses had been built to ADR59 standards then the occupants may have been retained in the vehicle and the emergency exits would have been a factor.
Several other less serious crashes involved frontal collision damage to the bus which prevented occupants from getting out via the front door and they had to use the emergency exit (generally with difficulty due to the height above the roadway).
The emergency exit provisions in ADR44/02, which applies to buses built
from July 1993, address these issues. Many of the serious coach crashes
occurred at night. ADR44/02 includes the provision of exit signs which
must remain illuminated for at least 15 minutes after the loss of battery
power. This requirement should be considered for inclusion in the "Code
of Practice for Improved Bus Occupant Safety".
In eight of the press clipping cases the bus caught fire. These cases accounted for ten fatalities and 25 serious injuries, although one case involved all ten fatalities and four serious injuries.
Three of the cases involved mini-buses. Apparently all three had petrol engines. In one of these cases the mini-bus hit a tree then caught fire. In the other two cases mini-buses caught fire while they were travelling along the road. Design and maintenance issues probably contributed to the latter two cases.
In two cases buses collided head-on with another vehicle which caught fire. In each case the fire engulfed the bus and the occupants had to escape via the rear window (emergency exit).
One case had the potential to be a very severe crash. A coach was pushed off a mountain road by a following coach, which experienced brake failure. The first coach rolled several times down an embankment. According to the presss report "it burst into flames after the occupants had escaped". 16 occupants received serious injuries in this crash.
It is evident that emergency exits near the rear of the vehicle are important in cases where a bus catches fire. Although bus fires are very rare, a simple precautionary measure would be to provide a battery isolating switch which activates in the event of a rollover. This assumes that illuminated exit signs will be available and that a back-up power source is available for any mobile telephone or two-way radio which is provided on the bus.
Flammability of bus materials appears to be adequately covered in the
ADRs.
Although route service buses are exempted from ADR66 "Seat strength, seat anchorage strength & padding in omnibuses", it is understood that Australian bus manufacturers now build route service buses with the ADR requirements for seat anchorages in mind. Consideration should be given to the application of the seat and seat anchorage strength requirements of ADR66 to all new buses.
The design of seats on many older buses operating in NSW, and probably
most other States, is very unsatisfactory in terms of occupant protection.
These seats have a hard unyielding top edge (usually with a stainless steel
handrail) and they are poorly anchored to the floor and side wall. Padding
should reduce the risk of minor injury from the top edge. Improved seat
anchorage strength is covered in the "Code of Practice for Improved Occupant
Protection in Buses" (which will be a voluntary code). Seat anchorages
should not, however, be strengthened without consideration of the remainder
of the seat structure because a seat which breaks apart in a crash could
cause more injury than one which comes adrift from its anchorages.
There are anecdotal reports of bus drivers failing to see pedestrians
or other vehicles at intersections due to the location of the external
right-hand mirror. Consideration should be given to expanding the field
of view provisions of ADR58.26 to ensure the driver has an adequate field
of view to the front and both sides.
Coaches operating in NSW are required to be fitted with a "Vehicle Monitoring Device"(VMD) such as a tachograph or electronic trip recorder. This is an operational requirement, associated with log-books and hours of driving, rather than a construction requirement.
In the absence of the NSW requirements, it is understood that most fleet operators would still fit vehicle monitoring devices to their coaches for fleet management purposes. In the circumstances, it appears that the main objections to regulations requiring the use of VMDs in NSW were based on concerns about government officers having access to the records.
VMDs have several safety benefits relating to speeding and fatigue. They can also provide very useful information about pre-crash events. For example, a study of VMD records might help to answer questions about the value of ABS in heavy vehicle crashes because pre-crash decelerations would be known.
Moves towards industry self-regulation provide an opportunity to encourage/mandate
the widespread use of VMDs without the spectre of random audits of records
by government officers.
Unlike the USA, there are very few dedicated "school" buses in Australia. Most buses which are used for transporting school children are used for other services at other times. This places limits on the measures which can be used to improve the conspicuity of school buses.
Road accident records do not necessarily indicate the involvement of a bus in a pedestrian accident where a child is struck by another vehicle in the vicinity of a bus. An analysis of NSW pedestrian accidents during school hours in 1988-89 by the NSW Road Safety Bureau found, out of 107 cases:
*23 children emerged from the rear of a bus and were hit by a vehicle travelling in the opposite direction. Of these three were killed and ten received serious injuries. Two of the fatal cases and five of the serious injury cases were in 80 or 100km/h zone and the remainder were in 60km/h zones.
*One child was seriously injured while running across the road to catch a bus.
*Nine children were struck by a bus. One was killed and two were seriously injured.
Subsequently NSW introduced requirements for alternating flashing yellow lamps to be fitted at the front and rear of buses, together with signs indicating the presence of school children.
The finding that the more serious cases are likely to occur in 100km/h zones has implications for the brightness of lights used on school buses. A motorist travelling from either direction at 100km/h (28m/s) will need to see and recognise the flashing lights at least 250m away in order to be able to slow down to an appropriate speed (40km/h) without heavy braking. This distance appears large but it includes a distance of 70m covered in the normal reaction time of 2.5 seconds and a 30m buffer before the bus in addition to the actual distance over which braking takes place. At the time of the Road Safety Bureau study South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia had speed limits in the vicinity of stopped school buses.
Aftermarket turn signal lamps which comply with the Australian Design Rules for day and night usage have insufficient luminous intensity (less than 200cd) for this purpose in bright daylight. The NSW Department of Transport is currently investigating the need for much brighter lamps (probably around 1800cd on-axis) with a fan shaped beam to avoid excessive glare at night. These investigations are based on well-established standards for traffic signals. Consideration is also being given to the combination of red and yellow lamps, as recommended in a recent NSW Staysafe Committee report.
The results of the NSW/Tasmanian investigations should be considered for adoption at a national level.
[end of extract]